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nyone who studies the early history of the Federal Reserve is bound
to notice a singular curiosity. In the 1920s and early 1930s, when
U.S. gold holdings were sufﬁciently large to relax the constraint of
the international gold standard and permit domestic control of the money
stock and price level, the Fed deliberately shunned the best empirical policy
framework that mainstream monetary science had to offer.




framework had by the mid-1920s progressed to the point where, statistically
and analytically, it was state of the art in policy analysis. Its constituent vari-
ables, all expressed in a form amenable to empirical measurement, had been
ﬁtted with relevant data series. It boasted the ability to establish empirical
causality between certain variables at cyclical and secular frequencies. It had
survived rigorous testing, by the standards of the time, for accuracy and use-
fulness. Most of all, as the basis of a coherent and well worked out monetary
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theory of the cycle, it claimed to predict the effects of Fed monetary policy
on output and prices in both the short run and the long. Here, ready-made,
seemed to be the answer to a central banker’s prayers. Here was a framework
the Fed could use to conduct policy and to stabilize the economy.
Yet the Fed refused to have anything to do with this framework and its
components. Instead of concentrating on the money stock, the price level,
and other indicators featured in the quantity theory, the Fed focused on such
measuresasthelevelofmarketinterestrates,thevolumeofmemberbankbor-
rowing, and the type and amount of commercial paper eligible for rediscount
at the central bank.
Why would the Fed, seemingly in need of reliable and accurate gauges
of the quantity and value of money, eschew them and the framework featur-
ing them? Why would it deny itself the opportunity to take advantage of
the improved empirical knowledge—and potential policy advances stemming
therefrom—embodied in the quantity theory and its associated monetary ap-
proach to the trade cycle?
The answer, of course, was that the quantity theory framework was in-
compatible with the type of institution created by the Federal Reserve Act of
1913. Far from being the activist, ambitious, price-level-stabilizing central
bank envisioned in the quantity theory, the Fed was instead a passive, decen-
tralized, noninterventionist system of 12 semi-autonomous but cooperating
regional Reserve Banks designed to accommodate automatically all produc-
tive (nonspeculative) business demands for credit and money over the cycle.
The 1913 Act expressly stated as much. Reserve Banks, it declared, exist
for the purpose of “accommodating commerce and business,” a purpose they
fulﬁll by “furnishing an elastic currency” and “affording a means of redis-
counting commercial paper.” Accommodation and regional autonomy were
the watchwords. The act said nothing about stabilization as a policy goal or
about a single central agency charged with the duty of achieving that goal.
Nevertheless,bythemid-1920stherewerevoices—somewithin,butmost
without, the Federal Reserve System—claiming that the Fed should have
learned that stabilization rather than accommodation was its overriding task
andthatcertainstatisticalmeasuresandindicatorswereavailabletohelpitac-
complishthattask. Accordingly,thesesamevoicesadvocatedthattheoriginal
Federal Reserve Act be amended to make price stability the chief responsi-




modation was its duty and that the proffered quantity theoretic measures were
irrelevanttothedischargeofthatduty. TheresultwasthattheFedspurnedthe
quantitytheoryormonetary-approach-to-the-business-cycleframeworkforan
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doctrine (also known as the commercial loan theory of banking), that frame-
work had nonmonetary forces driving the price level just as it had output and
the needs of commerce determining the money stock.
Since the doctrine taught (1) that money created by loans to ﬁnance real
productionratherthanspeculationhasnoinﬂuenceonprices,(2)thatcausality
runs from prices and output to money rather than vice-versa as in the quantity
theory, and (3) that Reserve Banks in no way possess control over money,
there was no reason for the Fed to accept a theory asserting the opposite.1
Indeed, as previously noted, throughout the 1920s ofﬁcials and economists
located at the Federal Reserve Board and certain regional Fed banks went out
of their way to reject the quantity theory approach to the business cycle and
its notion that the price level and real output could and should be stabilized
through money stock control.
The initial phase of the Great Depression starkly revealed the conse-
quences of the Fed’s choice of policy frameworks. That episode put the
rival frameworks to the test. The quantity theory framework passed the test
with ﬂying colors. Its indicators—money stock, price level, and real rates of
interest—correctly signaled that monetary policy was extraordinarily restric-
tive and likely to precipitate a contraction.
The real bills doctrine, on the other hand, failed the test. Its indicators—
member bank borrowing and nominal market rates of interest—signaled,
wrongly, that policy was remarkably easy so that the Fed had already done all
it could do to stop the slump. Guided by these indicators, the Fed did nothing
to arrest and reverse the monetary contraction that was pushing the economy
into depression.
Indeed, far from being alarmed by the monetary contraction, the Fed
saw it as precisely what the real bills doctrine prescribed in an environment
of falling output and employment. According to the doctrine, the slumping
levels of those variables meant that less money and credit were required to
ﬁnance them. Likewise, the price deﬂation accompanying the slump was
interpreted as indicating not that money and credit were tight, but rather that
the speculative excesses of the stock market boom of 1928–1929 were being
purged from the economy.
In brief, real bills indicators were telling the Fed early in the depression
that it was doing the right thing and that its policy was sound. In actuality,
however, the opposite was true, and real bills indicators were leading the Fed
astray. Those indicators, although accurate and precise, nevertheless wreaked
1 Conversely, there was every reason for Fed ofﬁcials to endorse a doctrine that implied that
their policies, being passive and automatic, could never be the cause of inﬂation or deﬂation.
Such a doctrine promised to exonerate the ofﬁcials from blame for these phenomena and perhaps
accounts for its appeal to them.68 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
havoc because they were embodied in a framework instructing policymakers
to let money and credit vary procyclically rather than countercyclically.
The story of the rival theories and their constituent policy indicators is
instructive for at least four reasons. First, it illustrates how different statistical
gauges can yield conﬂicting policy signals. Second, it indicates that theory
necessarily precedes measurement in the sense that central bankers must have
an analytical framework in place before they can determine the relevant in-
dicator variables to measure. Third, it reveals the corollary proposition that
policymakers observe only what they are predisposed to see; that is, it shows
that their chosen analytical framework dictates the very indicators to which
they will respond. Finally, it indicates that theories superﬁcially similar in
some respects can differ fundamentally in others. In the case of the quantity
theory and the real bills doctrine, while both recognized that money stock
growth in excess of output growth might be inﬂationary, they disagreed over
the cause. The quantity theory attributed inﬂation to the resulting excess ag-
gregate spending, but the real bills doctrine attributed it to the wrong kind
of spending—namely, spending for speculative, as opposed to productive,
purposes.
Likewise, the two theories yielded opposite predictions regarding the op-
timal cyclical behavior of the money stock. The real bills doctrine, stressing
as it did that output generates the very money necessary to purchase it off the
market, held that money should vary procyclically, rising with production in
booms and falling with it in slumps. By contrast, the quantity theory, hold-
ing as it did that output is independent of money in long-run equilibrium but
inﬂuenced strongly by it at cyclical frequencies, implied that money should
vary countercyclically (or at the very least grow continually at the economy’s
trend rate of output growth) in the interest of economic stabilization.
The following paragraphs discuss the development and application of the
twotheoriesandtheirassociatedpolicyindicatorsinthe1920sandearly1930s.
Three themes emerge. First, quantity theory indicators, although implied or
foreseen as early as 1911, had to evolve through several stages of statistical
work before emerging as serious candidates for use in policymaking in the
mid-1920s. Second, much the same can be said for the real bills doctrine. It
too had to undergo several modiﬁcations and applications in the period 1914–
1928 before it could feature member bank borrowing and market interest
rates as key policy guides. That the Fed was willing to countenance these
modiﬁcationsratherthanswitchtothequantitytheorytestiﬁestoitsallegiance
to the doctrine. Third, the doctrine’s failure to signal the onset of the Great
Depression indicates that the Fed had allied itself with a causal framework
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1. QUANTITY THEORY–MONETARY CYCLE FRAMEWORK
The distinguishing characteristic of the framework that vied unsuccessfully
for the Fed’s acceptance is easily described. It consisted of a causal chain
running from Fed policy to bank reserves to the money stock and thence to
generalpricesandrealoutput. ItimpliedthattheFedcouldcontrolthemoney
stock and thereby stabilize prices and smooth the business cycle. By the mid-
1920savigorousempiricaltraditionhaddevelopedintheUnitedStatesaround
the framework. Indeed, this strong empirical orientation was a distinguishing
featureoftheworkofAmericanquantitytheorists,whoseuseofstatisticaldata
to test and illustrate the theory went far beyond the efforts of their Cambridge
and continental counterparts. Key ﬁgures in this tradition included Simon
Newcomb, John Pease Norton, Edwin W. Kemmerer, Irving Fisher, Warren
M. Persons, Carl Snyder, and Holbrook Working.
It was Newcomb, a renowned astronomer and part-time economist, who,
in his 1885 Principles of Political Economy, suggested that David Ricardo’s
P = MV/T equation of exchange, which expressed the price level P as
the product of the stock of money M and its circulation velocity V per unit
of real transactions T, might serve as an empirical framework to examine
money’s effects on the economy.2 Newcomb also suggested an idea that
Norton, in his Statistical Studies in the NewYork Money Market, would later
incorporate into the most comprehensive and disaggregated version of the
equation ever published, namely the notion that the total stock of circulating
media could, in principle, be divided into its separate components—coin,
paper currency, demand deposits—each with its own velocity coefﬁcient.3
Inspired by Newcomb, Kemmerer, in his 1907 Money and Credit Instruments
in Their Relation to General Prices, and Fisher, in his 1911 The Purchasing
Power of Money, elaborated on Newcomb’s suggestions in at least ﬁve ways.
Kemmerer and Fisher incorporated variables representing checking de-
posits M  and their velocity V   into the equation to obtain P = (MV +
M V  )/T, where M denotes coin and currency and V its turnover velocity.
Then, constructing independent data series of index numbers for each of the
equation’s elements, they combined these individual series into a single se-
ries for the entire right-hand side of the equation.4 The resulting magnitude,
2 Ricardo (1810–1811, p. 311) stated the P = MV/T equation as follows: “Put the mass of
commodities of all sorts [T ] on one side of the line—and the amount of money [M ] multiplied
by the rapidity of its circulation [V ] on the other. Is not this in all cases the regulator of prices
[P]?”
3 Norton 1902, pp. 1–12. Besides containing terms for each type of coin and currency in
circulation and their velocities, Norton’s equation included notation for bank reserves, the deposit
expansion multiplier, proportion of maximum allowable deposits banks actually create, velocity of
deposits, and the discounted and full maturity values of bank loans—all for the four different
classes of banks existing in the United States in 1902.
4 Kemmerer’s and Fisher’s pathbreaking time series estimates of the exchange equation’s com-
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(MV + M V  )/T, gave them an estimated or predicted value of the price
level P, which they then compared with an independent price index series
representing the actual observed price level.5 Here was their statistical test
of the quantity theory proposition that velocity-augmented money (cash plus
checking deposits) per unit of trade determines the price level.
Visually comparing graphed curves of the two price series over the period
1878–1901, Kemmerer concluded that the ﬁt, or degree of correspondence
betweenthecurves,passedtheoculartestcloselyenoughtoverifythequantity
theory. When Warren Persons (1908, p. 289) questioned this conclusion by
calculating the correlation coefﬁcient for Kemmerer’s series and reporting it
as a meager 0.23 with a probable error of 0.13, Fisher ([1911] 1913, p. 294)
demonstratedinresponsethatthecoefﬁcientforthetwoseriesforthedifferent
period 1896–1909 was a whopping 0.97, indicating a very close ﬁt.
Further support for Fisher came when he ([1911] 1913, p. 295) and Per-
sons(1911,pp.827–28)appliedlink-relativeandproportional-ﬁrst-difference
techniques of trend removal to Fisher’s original series. Doing so, they found
that the correlation remained fairly high even when the series were cleansed
of serial correlation. Fisher argued that these correlations, together with his
ﬁnding that discrepancies between the actual and predicted price series fore-
casted the direction of movement of the former as it gravitated toward the
latter, veriﬁed the quantity theory.
Nevertheless, critics such as Benjamin Anderson (1917) contended that
Fisher’s work (and Kemmerer’s as well) consisted solely of attempts to con-
ﬁrm the equation of exchange rather than the quantity theory. They further
maintained that because the equation is an accounting identity—and with its
Fisher ([1911] 1913, pp. 430–88) but without going into detail, we can summarize these measure-
ments as follows: For Kemmerer, M (deﬁned as currency in the hands of the public) = currency
outside the Treasury – vault cash of reporting national and nonnational banks; V = MV/M = esti-
mated money transactions in 1896 arrived at by taking one-third of estimated check transactions for
that year/money stock for that year = 47, a ﬁxed constant assumed to hold in all years; M V   =
total check transactions estimated by the total value of checks passing through clearinghouses mul-
tiplied by a factor of 100/35 on the assumption that check clearings are a constant 35 percent of
total check circulation, this ﬁgure being the ratio of check clearings to estimated check circulation
for 1896; T = simple average of index numbers of population, merchandise exports and imports,
freight carried by railroads, and twelve other indicators of trade; P = weighted average of the
index numbers of wages, prices of railroad stocks, and wholesale commodity prices, with weights
of 3, 8, and 89 percent, respectively. For Fisher, M = Kemmerer’s measure – estimated vault
cash of nonreporting banks – revisions of estimated gold stock; V = MV/M = (cash deposited
in banks + wage bill)/cash in circulation (the numerator representing Fisher’s assumption that cash
paid to depositors circulates once before being deposited while that paid to non-depositors, namely
wage earners, circulates twice before being deposited), M  = individual deposits subject to check
= reported individual deposits + estimated checking deposits of nonreporting banks – clearinghouse
exchanges; V   = M V  /M  = volume of transactions settled by check/individual deposits subject to
check; T = average of index numbers of quantities of trade in various lines including 44 articles
of internal commerce and 25 of export, sales of stock, railroad freight carried, and letters through
the post ofﬁce; P = see next footnote.
5 Fisher constructed his independent price index series as a weighted average of the wholesale
prices of 258 commodities, hourly wage rates, and the prices of 40 stocks.T. M. Humphrey: Federal Reserve in the 1920s 71
velocity term deﬁned as V = PT/Ma tautological, or truistic, one at that—
accurate measurement of its constituent variables could result in no disparity
between the predicted and actual price levels that constituted the opposite
sides of the equation. If so, then high correlation between the two price series
indicates merely the absence of measurement error rather than the validity of
the quantity theory.
To counter such criticism, Fisher ([1911] 1913, p. 157) argued that the
accounting identity, together with his assumption that its constituent variables
are conceptually and empirically independent of each other, allowed him to
conﬁrm statistically that the price level P was indeed determined by velocity-
augmented money per unit of real output MV/T as the quantity theory held.
That is, he claimed that with velocity deﬁned independently of the other vari-
ables so that the equation becomes nontautological, the price level adjusts to
equate the real or price-deﬂated money stock M/P to the real demand for
it, this real demand being the fraction 1/V of real transactions T the public
wishes to hold in the form of real cash balances.
With the empirical quantity equation in place, New York Fed statisti-
cian Carl Snyder (1924, pp. 699, 710)—that rarest of birds: a Fed quantity
theorist—and University of Minnesota economist Holbrook Working (1923,
1926) applied it in an effort to establish the direction of causation between
money(deﬁnedbythemasdemanddeposits)andpricesatsecularandcyclical
frequencies. Secularly,theyfoundthelong-runpathofpricestobedetermined
jointly by the trend rates of growth of money, velocity, and trade. Of these
trend growth rates, velocity’s appeared to be essentially 0 percent whereas
trade’s was approximately 4 percent. They concluded that the money stock
must expand secularly at the 4-percent trend rate of trade growth to stabilize
the price level.
In short, Snyder andWorking had established that with velocity trendless,
the price level evolved secularly at a percentage rate equal to the difference
between the growth rates of money and trade. But when Snyder examined
the cyclical or deviation-from-trend behavior of the quantity-theory variables,
he claimed to have found that ﬂuctuations in velocity entirely accommodated
ﬂuctuations in trade so that the ratio k of those two variables remained at its
trend value. With k ﬁxed at trend, he concluded that money caused prices at
every point of the cycle.
Working, however, realized that things couldn’t possibly be that simple.
His data series told him that while money did indeed determine prices over
the cycle, it did so with a time delay or lag rather than contemporaneously.
In his interpretation, the resulting lagged adjustment of prices to changes in
the money stock necessitated compensating cyclical changes in the velocity-
to-trade ratio to keep the exchange equation in balance. In other words, the
ratio, far from adhering continuously to its trend equilibrium level, exhibited
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the deviations. Due to temporarily inﬂexible prices, monetary shocks initially
disturbed the ratio, driving it from equilibrium. With the inﬂexibility quickly
vanishing, corrective price-level changes subsequently occurred to eliminate
the deviation and restore the ratio to trend.
To estimate the lead-lag relationship between money and prices corre-
sponding to this result, Working (1923, 1926) correlated detrended money
with contemporaneous and lagged (that is, occurring later in time) measures
of the price level. He found that such correlations, though high for all lag
lengths up to a year, were highest at six to eight months. This result was
consistent with his ﬁndings attained through another method, namely through
direct comparison of the cyclical turning points of money and prices. There
Working found that trend-adjusted money not only consistently led or pre-
ceded prices in all 19 pairs of turning points examined, but did so with an
average lead time of 12 months at the lower turning points and 9 months at
the upper turning points. Here seemed to be strong statistical evidence of
money-to-price causality.
Fisher’s Version of the Framework
ToWorking’sanalysisofmoney’scyclicalprice-leveleffects,Fisheraddedhis
seminalandincisiveaccountoftheoutputandemploymenteffects. Inessence,
he equipped the framework with a relationship between output and surprise
inﬂation to argue that unanticipated price changes caused by monetary shocks
were responsible for ﬂuctuations in real interest rates and, through those real
rate movements, in output and employment as well. Towering above the rest,
his empirical contributions to the monetary theory of the cycle are to be found
in his three remarkable journal articles of 1923, 1925, and 1926. But he had
already sketched out the underlying theory in his classic 1911 volume The
Purchasing Power of Money.
There he argued that although money stock changes have no permanent,
enduring effect on real output and employment, they do affect those variables
temporarily over periods lasting perhaps as long as ten years. To account for
thesetransitoryrealeffects,Fisherappealedtotwoconceptsﬁrstenunciatedin
his1896monographAppreciationandInterest,namelythedistinctionbetween
real and nominal interest rates and the notion of asymmetrical expectations
between business borrowers and bank lenders. The ﬁrst concept deﬁnes the
real rate of interest as the difference between the nominal observed rate and
the expected rate of price inﬂation or deﬂation. The second concept says
that business borrowers, by virtue of being entrepreneurs, possess superior
foresight and so anticipate and therefore adjust to actual inﬂation faster than
do bank lenders. According to Fisher, inﬂation lowers the real rate as seen
by business borrowers. Bankers, however, being slower than their customers
to adjust their inﬂationary expectations, see a higher real rate of interest.T. M. Humphrey: Federal Reserve in the 1920s 73
Deﬂation works analogously to raise the real rate seen by borrowers more
than it does the real rate seen by bankers.
Fisher ([1911] 1913, pp. 55–73) attributed business cycles to such real
rate movements. An increase in the money stock sets prices rising. Because
nominalinterestrates(reﬂectingtheinferiorforesightofbankers)adjustmore
slowly to inﬂation than do the expectations of entrepreneurs, real rates as
seen by the latter group fall. (Similarly, real wage, rent, and raw material
costs also fall as their nominal values fail to adjust to inﬂation as fast as do
the expectations of entrepreneurs.) Such real rate falls, raising as they do
the expected rate of proﬁt on business projects ﬁnanced by bank loans, spur
correspondingrisesininvestment, output, andemployment. Astheexpansion
proceeds, banksrunupagainsttheirreserveconstraints. Moreover, theybegin
to lose reserves when depositors, who need additional coin and currency to
mediate a rising volume of hand-to-hand payments, withdraw cash from their
checking accounts (and so force, in a fractional Reserve banking system, a
multiple contraction of deposits). To protect their reserves from such cash
drains, banks raise their nominal loan rate until it catches up with and then
surpasses the increased rate of inﬂation. Real rates rise, thereby precipitating
the downturn. Causation runs from money to prices to real rates to output and
employment.
Having sketched his theory, Fisher then sought its empirical veriﬁca-
tion. Citing Working’s 1923 estimate that money stock changes over the
period1890–1921hadtemporallyprecededpricelevelchangesbyabouteight
months, hetookthisﬁndingasconstitutingstrongevidenceofmoney-to-price
causality (Fisher 1925, p. 199). To establish corresponding price-to-output
causality, he correlated distributed lags of rates of price-level change with an
index of the physical volume of trade (Fisher 1925).6 Likewise, to establish
price-to-employment causality, he correlated distributed lags of rates of price
change and employment (Fisher 1926). Finding a high correlation of 0.941
for the ﬁrst set of series and 0.90 for the second, he concluded that “the ups
and downs of [output and] employment are the effects...oftherises and falls
ofprices,dueinturntotheinﬂationanddeﬂationofmoneyandcredit”(Fisher
1926, p. 792).
Here was his statistical conﬁrmation of the trade cycle as a monetary
phenomenon receptive to a monetary cure. Cycles, in other words, stem from
price-level movements caused by misbehavior of the money stock. It follows
thatmonetarypolicy, properlyconducted, couldstabilizethepricelevelandin
sodoingeliminatethebusinesscycleaswell. Policymakershadbuttoobserve
6 Fisher employed at least three weighting schemes to distribute the lag. The ﬁrst used lin-
early declining monthly weights for eight-month intervals. The second used a unimodal sequence
of lag coefﬁcients to weight the past rates of price change. The third and most ambitious scheme
distributed the lag according to the density function of a lognormal distribution (see Chipman
[1999], pp. 192–94). All schemes yielded high correlation coefﬁcients.74 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
and react to the price level. Its deviations from target would trigger corrective
monetaryresponsesthatwouldrestoreittotarget. Thepricelevelitselfwasthe
main gauge of monetary policy. If the policymakers desired supplementary
indicators of monetary tightness or ease, they could observe the money stock
and real interest rates—the remaining chief variables of Fisher’s analysis.
2. THE FED’S FRAMEWORK
Fisher’scyclemodelspotlightedthemoneystock, pricelevel, andrealinterest
rate as indicators. It linked these indicators through a causal chain running
from the Fed to real activity, with the Fed actively initiating the causal se-
quence. The Fed determined the money stock. The money stock determined
thepricelevel. Thepricelevel, orratheritsrateofchange, temporarilymoved
the real rate of interest. Movements of the real rate inﬂuenced output and
employment. The cycle admitted to both a monetary cause and a monetary
cure. The Fed, by stabilizing the price level, could smooth the cycle as well.
By contrast, economists at the Federal Reserve Board in the 1920s ad-
hered to the real bills doctrine in which causation ran in the opposite direction
from prices and real activity to money, with the Fed occupying a passive,
accommodative role (Laidler 1999, p. 18; Yohe 1990, p. 486). In the Fed’s
framework,seasonalandcyclicalmovementsinrealactivitydrivebusinessde-
mands for bank loans. Since banks supply loans in the form of check-deposit
money subject to a ﬁxed fractional reserve requirement, these same move-
ments lead to corresponding changes in bank demands for reserves, reserves
borrowed from the Fed. The Fed passively accommodates these demands
by discounting bank paper. In so doing, it contributes seasonal and cyclical
elasticity to the money stock.
The Fed’s framework did not come ready-made, however. Like the quan-
tity theory whose elements, though assembled or foreseen as early as 1911,
only became fully coordinated into an empirical framework with Fisher’s
output-inﬂation correlations of the mid-1920s, the real bills doctrine had to go
through at least ﬁve overlapping stages before it emerged in the form the Fed
employed to conduct policy in the initial phase of the depression. First came
the pure or pristine version of the doctrine itself, which Fed ofﬁcials—Board
economists Adolph Miller, Walter W. Stewart, and Emanuel Goldenweiser;
Reserve Bank governors George W. Norris, James B. McDougal, George J.
Seay, and John W. Calkins; Federal Reserve System founders and architects
E.CarterGlassandH.ParkerWillis—inheritedfromnineteenth-centuryBank-
ing School economists (Laidler 1999, p. 18; Yohe 1990, p. 486). It was this
version that the above-named ofﬁcials, once freed of theirWorldWar I preoc-
cupation with selling bonds for the Treasury, sought to reformulate in order
to purge it of ambiguities and inconsistencies. Missing from the inherited
version were the notions of legal reserve requirements and of central banks asT. M. Humphrey: Federal Reserve in the 1920s 75
providers of reserves. Consequently, the second stage saw Fed ofﬁcials in the
period1919–1922correctthoseomissionsbyincorporatingintothedoctrinea
representation of the central bank’s rediscount function. Third and fourth, re-
spectively, camethe1923applicationofthedoctrinetoderiverealbillsguides
to policy and its 1926–1927 and 1928 employment to reject quantity theory
ones. Fifth came the attempt, starting in 1923, to reconcile the doctrine with
the newly discovered technique of open market operations. Such operations,
constituting as they did activist, discretionary policy intervention, conﬂicted
with the doctrine’s notion of policy as a passively accommodating and au-
tomatically self-correcting affair. The resulting reconciliation saw member
bank borrowing and market interest rates emerge in the mid- to late 1920s as
the doctrine’s key policy indicators.
Original Doctrine
The ﬁrst step of the Fed’s development of the real bills doctrine came with the
passage of the 1913 Federal Reserve Act directing the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem to enable trade to ﬂourish by providing the necessary money and credit.
Written into the act was the prototypal version of the doctrine inherited from
nineteenth-century Banking School economists. This version consisted of a
rule gearing money (and credit) to production via the short-term commer-
cial bill of exchange, thereby ensuring that output generates its own means
of purchase and that money adapts passively to the legitimate needs of trade
(Mints 1945, pp. 206–07, 284). The rule implied that money could be nei-
ther excessive nor deﬁcient when issued against short-term commercial paper
arising from real transactions in goods and services. More precisely, the rule
implied that as long as banks lend only against bona ﬁde commercial paper,
the money stock will be secured by and will automatically vary equipropor-
tionally with real output such that the latter will be matched by just enough
money to purchase it at existing prices.
Signiﬁcantly,therulealsoensuredthatnomonetaryoverhangcouldpersist
tosparkinﬂationafterthegoodsweresold. Instead,producerswouldusetheir
sales proceeds to pay off their loans and the money would return to the banks
to be retired from circulation. Here is the concept of the self-liquidating
loan that constitutes the bedrock principle of the doctrine. Only if loans
were made for speculative purposes would monetary overhang persist. Such
loans, being unproductive, would ﬁnance no real output to generate the sales
revenue leading to their retirement. Consequently, the loans and the money
issuedbywayofthemwouldremainoutstandingtovalidatehigherprices. The
limitation of loans to self-liquidating uses rules out this pathological case. In
short, inﬂationary overissue is impossible provided money is issued on loans
made to ﬁnance real, rather than speculative, transactions.76 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Reformulating the Doctrine
During the six years following the end of World War I, System founders and
architects Glass and Willis, together with Board economists Stewart, Miller,
Goldenweiser, and others, sought to spell out the logic of the foregoing im-
plications and give them an exact and systematic formulation (Laidler 1999,
pp.192–95;Yohe1990,p.486). Theyrealizedthatdoingsowouldremoveam-
biguities that clouded earlier statements of the doctrine, statements that Lloyd
Mints, the leading expert on the doctrine’s history, described as “invariably
brief, incomplete, and frequently not consistent” (1945, p. 206). Correcting
those statements and getting the doctrine right became the ﬁrst order of busi-
ness. It was absolutely essential to articulate precisely the framework that the
FederalReserveActhadmandatedasapolicyguideandtospotlightitsindica-
tor variables in sharp relief. In their reformulation, Fed ofﬁcials presented no
formal equations, not even rudimentary ones. Nevertheless, their statements
can be expressed symbolically and condensed into a simple algebraic model
without doing violence to their intentions. Their words, as contained in their
speeches, writings, and testimony before congressional committees, resemble
the following set of instructions for formalizing the doctrine:7
First, deﬁne the needs of trade N as the value of inventories of working
capital, or goods-in-process G, the production and marketing of which is
ﬁnanced by bank loans. Symbolically,
N = G. (1)
Asshownbelow,Fedofﬁcialsmeasuredthisneeds-of-trade,ornominaloutput,
variable by using the Board’s index of industrial production to capture its
physical product component and the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ wholesale
price index to represent its nominal dollar component.
Second, assume that each dollar’s worth of goods-in-process G generates
an equivalent quantity of paper claims in the form of commercial bills B,
which business borrowers offer as collateral to back their loan demands Ld.
That is, assume that
G = B, (2)
and that
B = Ld. (3)
7 See, for example, Willis’s statements quoted in Laidler (1999, p. 194) and West (1977,
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Third, observe that these loan demands Ld pass the real bills test (that is,
they are secured by claims to real goods) and therefore qualify for matching
supplies of bank loans Ls as indicated by the expression
Ld = Ls. (4)
Fourth, note that since banks supply loans in the form of bank notes and
checking deposits the sum of which comprises the stock of bank money, the
supply of loans Ls must equal that money stock M,
Ls = M. (5)
Substituting equations (1) through (4) into (5) and solving for the money
stock yields
M = N, (6)
whichsaysthataslongasbankslendonlyagainstshort-termcommercialbills
arising from transactions in real goods and services, the money stock M will
conform to the needs of trade N.Since the needs of trade N are by deﬁnition
the same as the value of goods-in-process G, one can also write
M = G, (7)
which states that the supply of bank money is ultimately secured by goods-in-
process such that when those goods reach the market they will be matched by
just enough money to purchase them at existing prices. This result, namely
thatthemoneystockisjustsufﬁcienttobuythegoodsproduced,canbeshown
by deﬁning the value of goods-in-process G as the multiplicative product of
the price P and quantity Q of those goods when they emerge as ﬁnal output,
that is,
G = PQ. (8)
Hereoneavoidsastock-ﬂowdimensionalityproblembytreatingtheinventory
of goods in process (a stock) as turning over once per period in the production
of output (a ﬂow). In short, multiplying the G variable by its (implied) unit
turnover coefﬁcient converts it into a ﬂow, thus rendering both sides of the
equation dimensionally equivalent.
Substituting equations (8) and (5) into (7) yields
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which says that, taking prices P as given and determined by nonmonetary
considerations, the money stock M and volume of bank credit Ls vary in step
with real production Q.8
Here was the essence of the real bills doctrine. Its ﬂaw, of course, is its
treatment of prices and output as given exogenous variables when, as Fisher
(and indeed quantity theorists extending back as far as David Hume) had
shown, they move under the inﬂuence of changes in the money stock itself.
Accordingly, when the Fed measured output and prices, it did so not with the
Fisherian intention of attributing their movements to an excess or deﬁcient
money stock, but rather with the intention of estimating, or predicting, the
supply of real bills it would be called upon to rediscount so member banks
might obtain sufﬁcient reserves to accommodate business demands for credit.
Augmenting the Doctrine
When the Federal Reserve Act authorized Reserve Banks to rediscount bank
paper, it introduced a new element into the real bills version of the monetary
transmissionmechanism. Steptwoofthereformulationoftherealbillsframe-
worksawFedfoundersandeconomistsinthelate1910sandearly1920srecog-
nize this element by incorporating a representation of the rediscount function
into the framework. The rediscount function was crucial to banks who, facing
a mandatory legal reserve ratio r, had to obtain the necessary reserves R to
back the money and credit required by the needs of trade. The Fed enabled
banks to do so by rediscounting the commercial paper they had acquired from
their customers. By limiting the type of paper eligible for rediscount, the Fed
ensured that reserves were just sufﬁcient to underwrite production without
promoting speculation. Nonborrowed sources of reserves, including inﬂows
of gold and currency, were dismissed as superﬂuous. Ideally, the discount
window could supply all the reserves necessary to meet the needs of trade.9
And it could do so at a discount rate normally aligned with or below short-
term market interest rates so as to pose no barrier to accommodation. In short,
the commercial banking system faced a reserve constraint R = rM, which it
8 Expression (9), of course, is simply the equation of exchange MV = PQ with the velocity
term V assigned a value of one, or unity. The unit velocity term corresponds to the notion of the
self-liquidating loan according to which output induces, via collateralized loans, money sufﬁcient to
purchase it and to retire the loans. Consumers spend the money once and once only on the ﬁnal
product. Recipient producers then use the resulting sales receipts to pay off their loans and the
money returns to the banks who retire it from circulation. Quantity theorists, however, questioned
such reasoning. They argued that money, once created, might be spent several times before loans
were repaid. And even when loans were repaid, bankers might relend the proceeds so that the
new money would remain in circulation with a velocity greater than unity.
9 In Wheelock’s words (1991, p. 13), “The Real Bills Doctrine implied that rediscounts alone
would provide sufﬁcient liquidity to accommodate commerce and meet ﬁnancial emergencies. No
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satisﬁed by borrowing from the Fed. With nonborrowed reserves ignored, all
reserves were borrowed reserves RB such that R = RB.
The signiﬁcance of the foregoing propositions cannot be overestimated.
Here was the view, dominant at the Federal Reserve Board in the early 1920s,
of the Fed as passive accommodator rather than active initiator of changes
in economic activity. Here was the idea that causation runs from output and
prices to loans to bank money, with the Fed supplying the necessary reserves.
Standing at the end of the causal queue, the Fed could not force money on
the economy; it merely supplied reserves on demand. Of course, it could
inﬂuence this demand through changes in its rediscount rate, but even so it
still would have to accept all real bills tendered it at the prevailing rate. The
contrast with the quantity theory could hardly have been more pronounced.
Making the Model Operational
StepthreeofthedevelopmentoftherealbillsdoctrinesawBoardeconomists—
some newly hired when the Federal Reserve System’s main research ofﬁce,
of whichWalter Stewart had been appointed director in July 1922, was moved
fromNewYorktoWashington—givethedoctrineoperationalcontentbydeﬁn-
ing its variables so that they could be measured and serve as policy guides.
Output Q was deﬁned as aggregate physical product as measured by the
Board’s own monthly index of industrial production. Dating from Decem-
ber 1922 and constructed from data on output produced in manufacturing and
mining, this index was principally the work of Walter Stewart and Woodlief
Thomas. It had forerunners in the production indexes developed by Wesley
Clair Mitchell for the War Production Board in 1917, by Carl Snyder for the
New York Fed in 1918–1920, and by Stewart himself in 1921 before he left
Amherst College to go to the Board. The Board gave this index pride of place
in its collection of statistical measures for two reasons. The index quantiﬁed
the needs-of-business criterion of the Federal ReserveAct. It also represented
the strategic variable that according to the real bills doctrine drove all other
variables—loans, bills, money stock—in the credit mechanism.
Likewise, the Board deﬁned productive loans L as bank credit advanced
solely to ﬁnance the production and marketing of goods in the agricultural,
industrial,andcommercialsectorsoftheeconomy. (TheBoardalsopublished
in its monthly Bulletin ﬁgures on what it regarded as speculative lending,
notably loans to brokers and dealers, real estate loans, and long-term capital
investment loans.) As for the assets securing, or backing, productive loans,
theBoarddeﬁnedrealbillsB aspaperpledgedascollateralforsuchloansand
eligible for rediscount at the Fed. The exact counterpart of productive loans,
suchbillsconstitutedevidenceoftheirsoundness. HerewastheBoard’sbelief
thatthetypeofpaperbanksacquireinmakingloansdescribesandgovernsthe
particular use of the borrowed funds. Here was its conviction that real bills80 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
signify and measure productive credit just as non-real bills denote speculative
credit.
This belief—that the type of collateral corresponds to the use of borrowed
funds—was not shared by all. As early as November 28, 1922, in a talk
to the Graduate Economics Club at Harvard, Benjamin Strong of the New
York Fed opposed the belief on the grounds that the very ﬂuidity of credit
across uses and instruments renders it fallacious (Chandler 1958, pp. 197–
98). With credit fungible, banks and their customers could borrow on real
bills to ﬁnance speculation. Conversely, they could borrow on speculative
paper—stocks, bonds, and mortgages—to ﬁnance production. If so, then type
of paper is independent of purpose of loan and there is no assurance that
credit advanced on real bills will remain in productive channels. But many
Fedofﬁcials,notablyMillerandReserveBankgovernorsCalkins,McDougal,
Norris, and Seay, disagreed with Strong and throughout the 1920s continued
to argue that the form of collateral denotes the particular use of the borrowed
funds.
As for the money stock M, the Fed thought so little of it as a strategic
variable that it published no series on it before 1941. True, the Board did
collect data on the currency and demand deposit components of the money
stock. And it even published information on these individual components,
including(1)monthlyﬁguresoncurrencyincirculation,(2)aseriesonweekly
reporting member banks that contained substantial detail on deposits, and (3)
a semiannual all-bank series that one could use to establish benchmarks for
monthly deposit estimates based on those of reporting member banks. But
the Board never assembled these components into a single comprehensive
measure of the money stock. Indeed, it had little reason to do so. Guided as
it was by the real bills doctrine, the Board saw money creation as simply a
byproduct, or secondary side effect, of bankers’loan decisions. To the Board,
loans, not money, were what mattered. Provided banks made the right kind
of loans, the money stock would take care of itself.
The ﬁnal step in the Board’s effort to make the doctrine operational in-
volved deﬁning the price level P as measured by the wholesale price index.
The Board attributed movements in this latter index either to the long-term
operationofexogenousrealforces,notablytechnologicalprogressorresource
scarcity, or to short-term speculation, that is, to nonproductive uses of money
and credit. Accordingly, secular price changes were ascribed either to cost-
reducing productivity growth or cost-enhancing capacity constraints. Like-
wise, short-term rises in the price level were seen as evidence of a speculative
withholding of goods from the market in anticipation of the higher future
prices they might bring. And short-term falls in the price level were seen as
the inevitable consequence of the bursting of the speculative bubble as goods
were dumped on the market at ﬁre-sale prices. The Fed’s inclination was to
interferelittleornotatallwiththeselatterpricefalls. Indeed,itregardedthemT. M. Humphrey: Federal Reserve in the 1920s 81
as necessary to purge the economy of its preceding speculative excesses. The
upshot was the Fed watched the price index for evidence of speculation and
its aftermath rather than for evidence that money was plentiful or tight.
Policy Guides in the Board’s Tenth Annual Report
With these deﬁnitions and interpretations in hand, Stewart, writing (with
Miller’s support) in the Board’s famousTenthAnnual Report (1923) speciﬁed
two policy guides designed to ensure that the volume of money and credit was
neither excessive nor deﬁcient.10 These were the celebrated quantitative and
qualitative tests, respectively.11
The quantitative test focused on the ratio of credit (or money) to trade.
(Again, the Board’s index of industrial production measured trade’s real, or
output, component and the wholesale price index its nominal, or price, com-
ponent.) In the words of Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 253), the test
consisted of a “marriage of the traditional real bills doctrine and an inventory
theory of the business cycle.” Of this pair, the real bills component stated
that money M and credit Ls are optimally supplied when variations in their
quantity match corresponding variations in nominal product or income PQ
according to the equation M = Ls = PQ.12 In other words, money and
credit would exhibit desirable elasticity when they rose and fell in procyclical
fashion with the dollar value of real output whose ﬁnancing they supported.13
The inventory theory component added the proviso that money and credit
should so behave only as long as they ﬁnance no speculative inventory accu-
mulation.14 Money and credit should not, that is, ﬁnance production destined
10 Here Board economists obviously departed from the prototypal Banking School version of
the doctrine. According to that version, money and credit require no quantitative policy guides since
their amounts will automatically adjust to the needs of trade with neither excess nor deﬁciency
as long as banks, commercial and central, make short-term, self-liquidating loans to ﬁnance the
production and marketing of real goods and services.
11 For critical evaluation of these tests, see Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 252–53) and
Mints (1945, pp. 265–68). For more sympathetic treatments, see Hardy (1932, pp. 74–80), Reed
(1930, pp. 59–64), West (1977, pp. 195–98), and Wicker (1966).
12 Hardy (1932, p. 77) and Reed (1930, p. 62) go out of their way to emphasize this point.
They note that the quantitative test called for the money stock to vary automatically with corre-
sponding variations both in prices and output.
13 That money and credit must vary procyclically rather than countercyclically according to
the quantitative test was well understood. Hardy (1932, pp. 78–79) described how credit must,
under the provisions of the test, adapt passively to the cycle, falling when business declines and
expanding when business expands. The test, Hardy insisted, was not designed to ensure that money
varies countercyclically so as to stimulate activity in slumps and damp it in booms. Rather the
test was designed to ensure that money and credit adapt themselves passively to prevailing cyclical
conditions.
14 Hardy’s account (1932, p. 77) of the inventory proviso is classic. The Fed’s responsibility,
he says, is “not to check price increases [associated with expanding production] but to supply a
volume of credit appropriate to the higher prices, so long as the latter are not interpreted as the
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for speculative stockpiling rather than for ﬁnal sales. The danger is that such
stocks of commodities eventually would be dumped on the market to depress
prices and real activity. Evidently, the sharp boom-bust cycle of 1919–1921
had taught the Fed that such an outcome could happen. It had revealed that
evenlegitimatecreditexpansioncould,byﬁnancinginventoryoverinvestment
instead of production for ﬁnal consumption, lead to an inﬂationary shortage
of consumers’ goods followed by deﬂation when the excess stocks of those
goods ﬁnally ﬂooded the market. But this inventory cycle proviso, with its
implication that credit is put to speculative uses when it ﬁnances production
for inventory rather than for consumption, is inconsistent with the original or
pristine version of the real bills doctrine. The latter, of course, equates all
production, regardless of its purpose, with the proper use of credit.
Finally, the qualitative test stated that money is optimally supplied when
it passes the real bills test, that is, when it is extended on loan for productive
purposes as evidenced by eligible paper in bank portfolios. Whereas the
quantitative test, sheared of its inventory proviso, stated that money and credit
cannotbeoverissuedwhentheymoveone-for-onewiththevalueofrealoutput,
the qualitative test assures that this outcome is automatically achieved when
banks lend only on real bills—in other words, when loan expansion goes
100 percent to ﬁnance working capital needs and 0 percent to ﬁnance ﬁxed
capital investment and stock market speculation. The latter test implied that
quantitative control can be attained through qualitative means, and the Board
took this implication seriously. It largely abandoned quantitative tests after
the mid-1920s, when its concern shifted from accommodating production to
stopping speculation in the stock market (see Reed [1930], pp. 60, 63; Yohe
[1990], p. 482).
Rejection of Quantity Theory Indicators
After deploying their framework to champion real bills indicators, Board
economists Miller, Stewart, and Goldenweiser put it through its fourth devel-
opmental stage when they applied it to reject rival quantity theory indicators,
speciﬁcally those of the price level and the money supply. Their doctrine
taught them that money was demand-determined, that real forces drive the
price level, and that causation runs from prices (and real activity) to money
rather than vice versa as in the quantity theory. Accordingly, when Congress
held hearings in 1926–1927 and 1928 on Kansas Representative James G.
Strong’s proposed legislation to make price level stability an explicit goal of
monetary policy, Fed economists who testiﬁed at the hearings expressed their
opposition in no uncertain terms (see U.S. Congress [1926, 1928]).15
15 On Fed testimony in the stabilization hearings, see Hetzel (1985), Hardy (1930, pp. 207–
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Starting with an attack on the quantity theory’s key price level indicator,
Stewart,Miller,andGoldenweiserdeniedthatitwasareliableorusefulpolicy
guide. First, they claimed that the Fed cannot control the price level because
nonmonetary forces outside the Fed’s sphere of inﬂuence determine that vari-
able. NewYorkFedGovernorBenjaminStrong, whoadheredtosomestrands
of the real bills doctrine while rejecting others, voiced a variant of this argu-
ment. Even if money can inﬂuence the price level, he declared, it is but one of
many factors doing so. Other factors include a variety of real shocks plus the
state of business conﬁdence and the public’s expectations of the future, none
of which the Fed controls (U.S. Congress 1926, p. 482). Quantity theorists
including John R. Commons readily agreed with this point but still contended
that monetary policy was powerful enough to offset these forces and stabilize
the price level (Hardy 1932, p. 207).
But Stewart and Miller countered that even if Commons were right and
the Fed could indeed stabilize the price level, it nevertheless has no business
doing so. In their view, the Fed has no right to interfere either with price falls
caused by cost-reducing technological progress or with price rises caused
by exhaustion of supplies of scarce natural resources. To this contention
quantity theorists like Fisher replied that in the absence of changes in the








prices unchanged. Only if cost shocks had an impact on the total volume of
output or trade could they alter the price level associated with a given money
stock. Fed economists offered no rebuttal to this argument. Instead, they
advanced another reason why the general price level is a poor policy guide,
namely that the public would confuse it with the prices of speciﬁc goods and
assume that a policy of price-level stabilization required stabilization of the
prices of individual commodities (Hardy 1930, p. 207).
Finally, Board economists condemned price-level indicators on purely
technical grounds. Stewart used a chart showing the 1921–1926 behavior of
the wholesale price index and its agricultural and nonagricultural components
to dismiss aggregate indexes of the price level as meaningless averages mask-
ingdiversemovementsoftheirindividualcomponents(U.S.Congress[1926],
pp. 741–47; see also U.S. Congress [1928], p. 40). AndAdolph Miller, citing
long lags in price adjustment, argued that the price level registers inﬂationary
and deﬂationary pressures too late for policy to forestall them (U.S. Congress
1926, pp. 837–38). Longtime Fed Board member Charles S. Hamlin added84 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
that there are many different measures of the price level, including wholesale
price, retail price, and cost-of-living indexes, as well as Snyder’s comprehen-
sive composite index (which, in addition to wholesale and retail commodity
prices, included wages, rents, and stock prices as well) (U.S. Congress 1928,
p.393). Eachmeasuremaybehavedifferently—Hamlinnotedthe12,2,and0
percent falls of the wholesale, cost-of-living, and Snyder indexes respectively
for the period 1925–1927—and may call for a different stabilization action.
What should the Fed do when confronted with alternative index numbers that
are, say, simultaneously rising, falling, and remaining unchanged? Which
index should it choose?
As for the money stock, Stewart, Miller, and company likewise gave it
short shrift as an indicator. It was, they claimed, useless as a policy guide
because the Fed exercised no control over it. Instead, the public determines
the money stock through its demand for bank loans just as the needs-of-trade
doctrine contended. The money stock was likewise useless as an indicator
of inﬂationary or deﬂationary pressure because it did not determine the price
level—or at least it did not do so if created by way of loans made to ﬁnance
nonspeculative activity. In this case, the money stock adapted passively to
the needs of trade valued at the prevailing price level, a price level whose
path was determined by real considerations such as technological progress,
productivity growth, and growing resource scarcity. Miller said it all when he
insistedthatneitherassumptionofthequantitytheory—thatFedpolicycauses
money stock changes and that the latter cause corresponding changes in the
price level—is true (U.S. Congress 1928, p. 109).
The outcome was that Fed ofﬁcials contended that the considerations de-
scribed above rendered the quantity theory and its money stock and price
level indicators unﬁt for policy use. The Fed might collect data on those in-
dicators and report them in its publications. It might even monitor them as
background information from time to time. In no case, however, would it use
them for stabilization purposes. The Fed’s arguments proved convincing to
inﬂuential congressmen, economists, and bankers alike. Quantity theorists
were unsuccessful in getting their price stability target enacted into law.
Incorporation of Open Market Operations
Ironically, the main challenge to the real bills doctrine came not from the
quantitytheorybutratherfromtheFed’sowndiscoveryin1922–1923ofopen
market operations as a means of reserve control. In incorporating this new
policy instrument into the real bills framework, Board economists evidently
reconciled the irreconcilable. That is to say, they reconciled the instrument
with a doctrine whose precepts it violated in at least three ways. First, open
market operations, involving as they did purchases and sales of U.S. gov-
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in short-term, self-liquidating commercial paper. Government securities, ac-
cording to the pristine version of the doctrine, represented speculative rather
than productive use of credit. Second, when the Fed conducted open market
operations, itdidsoatitsowninitiative. Suchactiveinterventionclashedwith
the principle of passive accommodation according to which the initiative for
reserveprovisionshouldcomenotfromtheFedbutratherfrommemberbanks
and their customers responding to the needs of trade. Finally, open market
operations contradicted the idea that additional means of reserve provision
were superﬂuous since banks could always obtain sufﬁcient reserves at the
discount window. How could the use of such an instrument be squared with
the real bills doctrine?
The Fed’s “great discovery” (Burgess 1964, p. 220) of the so-called scis-
sors,ordisplacement,effectpermittedthereconciliation.16 Thescissorseffect
referred to the tendency of compensating changes in discount-window bor-
rowing to offset open market operations leaving total reserves unchanged (see
Friedman and Schwartz [1963], pp. 251, 272, 296, Yohe [1990], p. 483, and
U.S. Congress [1926], p. 749). W. Randolph Burgess and Benjamin Strong of
the NewYork Fed andAdolph Miller, Walter Stewart, and Winﬁeld Rieﬂer at
the Board discovered this phenomenon in 1922–1923. To their surprise, they
found that open market sales, by removing reserves, induced member banks
to come to the discount window to recoup the lost reserves. Conversely, open
market purchases, by increasing reserves, enabled member banks to reduce
their indebtedness to the Fed by the full amount of the purchases. In both
cases, compensatory changes in member bank borrowing tended to counter-
actthereserveeffectsofopenmarketoperations. BorrowedreservesRB varied
inversely with open market operations omo (as measured by changes in the
Fed’s holdings of government securities) in a one-for-one relationship:17
RB =− omo (10)
or
RB/omo =− 1. (11)
Thescissorseffectpromptedtwointerpretationsofopenmarketoperations
consistent with the real bills doctrine. According to the ﬁrst, voiced primarily
by Miller and Stewart, such operations constituted a test of whether reserves
and the deposit money they supported were in excess of the needs of trade
(seeFederalReserveBoard[1923], pp.13–14). Openmarketoperationswere
16 The appellation is due to Harold Reed (1930, p. 28), who coined it.
17 On the one-for-one, or dollar-for-dollar, relationship between discount-window borrowing
and open market operations, see Yohe (1990, p. 483) and Meltzer (1997, p. 184).86 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
taken at the initiative of the Fed, but the initiative to borrow or repay at the
discountwindowcamefrommemberbanksseekingtoaccommodatetheneeds
of trade. If so, then the extent to which banks borrowed to replace reserves
lost through open market sales measured the true, or real bills, demand for
such reserves. The open market operations themselves tested, or revealed, the
extent of this demand.
Let the Fed apply the test by withdrawing, via open market sales, reserves
from the banking system. If banks replenished all the lost reserves through
increased borrowing at the discount window, this response would prove that
reservesanddepositswerenotexcessive. Reserveswerenotexcessivebecause
banks, in borrowing them, had to rediscount real bills equal to them in dollar
value. That banks were willing to do so was proof positive that the reserves
and deposits were not excessive to the needs of trade. Only if banks failed
to recoup, via the rediscount of real bills, all the reserves lost through open
market sales would such reserves be proved excessive.
The second interpretation, expounded by Burgess, Strong, and Rieﬂer,
was the more extreme of the two.18 It held that open market operations could
be employed to control the volume of discount-window borrowing. That is, if
such borrowing varied in an inverse, dollar-for-dollar ratio with open market
operations as the RB/omo =− 1 scissors effect implied, then the Fed could
control the numerator by regulating the denominator. Via open market sales,
the Fed could compel banks to borrow just as surely as it could, through
open market purchases, spur them to repay their indebtedness. True, the very
notion of the Fed controlling discount-window activity through open market
operations clashed with the passive-accommodation principle of the real bills
doctrine. Nevertheless, other strands of the doctrine were preserved. The
Fed was still obliged to rediscount upon demand all the eligible paper offered
it at any level of open market operations. Moreover, banks still eliminated
their reserve deﬁciencies and excesses by rediscounting and repurchasing,
respectively, realbillsatthediscountwindow. Finally, businessloandemands
still drove the generation of credit and money, with the Fed supplying the
necessary borrowed reserves, albeit using open market operations to force
bankstoborrow. Onthesegrounds, atleast, therealbillsdoctrinewasupheld.
Key Indicators Established
The result was to render member bank borrowing and market interest rates
the chief indicators of policy. Burgess (1927) and Rieﬂer (1930) saw both
18 Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer christened this interpretation the “Rieﬂer-Burgess doctrine”
after Winﬁeld W. Rieﬂer and W. Randolph Burgess, the two Fed economists who gave it its classic
exposition. Governor Benjamin Strong of the New York Fed was a staunch proponent of the
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indicators as measuring the degree of policy tightness or ease produced by
open market sales and purchases, respectively. With respect to the borrow-
ing indicator, the inverse one-for-one relationship between it and open market
operations guaranteed that it would be an accurate indicator of the thrust, or
pressure, exerted by the latter. Thus, when restrictive open market sales pres-
sured banks to borrow, the magnitude of the borrowing (in excess of the Fed’s
desired target level of borrowed reserves, which Benjamin Strong in 1926
suggested was $500–$600 million) would capture the degree of restriction.
Conversely, when expansionary open market purchases spurred banks to re-
pay their indebtedness, the resulting reduction in borrowing (below the Fed’s
$500–$600 million borrowed reserve target) would indicate the extent of the
ease. The inverse relation ensured as much.
As for market rates, they sent the same signal as member bank borrowing
because borrowing was the chief inﬂuence determining them. When borrow-
ing was high, banks, being reluctant to remain continually in debt with the
Fed, would be under great pressure to reduce their indebtedness.19 To obtain
the funds to do so, they would call in outstanding loans and curtail further
lending. The resulting reduction in loan supply would raise market interest
rates. Thegreatertheindebtednessandthustheurgencytorepayit,thegreater
the upward pressure on rates and so the higher their level. Contrariwise, when
borrowing was low and banks had repaid their indebtedness, they would be
willing to expand their lending. The resulting expansion in loan supply rela-
tive to loan demand would put downward pressure on rates. In short, market
interest rates, because they varied directly with the scale of member bank bor-




Signals Flashed by the Indicators Early in the
Depression
Relying on member bank borrowing and market interest rates as indicators,
the Fed judged its policy to be remarkably easy in the initial phase (October
1929–1931) of the Great Depression. By mid-1931, member bank borrowing
and market rates had fallen respectively to one-ﬁfth and one-third of their
October 1929 levels (Wheelock 1998, pp. 130–31, 133). By all accounts
19 Fed economists, notably Rieﬂer (1930) and Burgess (1927), cited a so-called tradition
against borrowing or reluctance to borrow that was supposed to make banks eager to repay their
indebtedness. Allegedly, such reluctance held even when borrowing was proﬁtable, that is, when
a positive spread between bank loan rates and the discount rate indicated that the expected rate
of return on the use of borrowed reserves exceeded the cost of such reserves. See Meltzer (1976,
pp. 464–65) for a concise summary of the reluctance hypothesis.88 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
both indicators were at extremely low levels—borrowing averaging but $243
millionfromJanuary1930toSeptember1931,theTreasurybillrateaveraging
lessthan2percentoverthatsameperiod—suggestingthattheFedhadalready
done all it could do to arrest the depression. These were the indicators that
the Fed used to justify its policy of inaction.
Bycontrast,therivalquantitytheoryindicators—moneystock,pricelevel,
and real interest rates—were ﬂashing the opposite signal. Thus Lauchlin
Currie’s pioneering series of the M1 money stock showed falls of 3.7 and
6.3 percent, respectively, in 1930 and 1931. Currie’s ﬁgures, later conﬁrmed
by Clark Warburton (1945, 1946), Lloyd Mints (1950, p. 38; 1951, p. 193),
and Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz (1963), were reported both in his
Harvard Ph.D. thesis, which he wrote in 1929–1930 and submitted in January
1931, and in his 1934 The Supply and Control of Money in the United States.
Such ﬁgures were fully available to the Fed at the time and could have been
computed from data it regularly collected from the banking system.
LikewiseavailabletotheFedweremeasuresofthepricelevel,particularly
indexes of wholesale commodity prices. They had, by 1931, fallen by more
than a quarter of their 1929 level. As for the real interest rate, as measured
by the short term government yield plus the percentage rate of change of the
wholesale price index, it had risen by mid-1931 to a level of 10.5 percent,
more than 6 percentage points above its 1929 level. Here was clear evidence
that monetary policy was extremely tight, not easy, and that expansionary
measures should be taken immediately to prevent further contraction in real
activity. But the Fed either disregarded these signals or interpreted them as
indicating that the money stock was behaving correctly. Indeed, it interpreted
falls in the money stock as entirely appropriate given the fall in prices and
output. Monetary contraction in response to the decline in nominal income
was precisely what the M = PQequation of the real bills doctrine called for.
CONCLUSION
History would have been different had the Fed incorporated quantity theoretic
insights into its analytical policy framework in the 1920s and early 1930s.
The quantity theory model of the business cycle featured statistical indicators
that would have signaled that monetary policy was too tight and needed eas-
ing in the early years of the Great Depression. Acting on those indicators,
the Fed could have eased policy and so perhaps prevented the depression or
at least mitigated its severity. Instead, Fed ofﬁcials adhered to an entirely
different framework whose indicators signaled that policy was remarkably
easy and that the central bank had already done all it could do to arrest the
slump.Accordingly, theFeddidnothingandlettheeconomyslidefurtherinto
the depression.T. M. Humphrey: Federal Reserve in the 1920s 89
The Fed’s failure to act shows that its adherence to the real bills doctrine
had deleterious consequences. These consequences might have been avoided
hadtheFedselectedattheoutsetthestate-of-the-artquantitytheoryframework
rather than the ﬂawed real bills framework. The moral is clear: Accuracy and
precision are not the only determinants of the usefulness of measurements in
policymaking. The conceptual framework that deﬁnes and constrains what is
measured and how it is measured establishes the effectiveness and usefulness
ofthosemeasurements. Intheearly1930s,themeasurementsemanatingfrom
the quantity theory framework might have accomplished what their real bills
counterparts could not, namely help the Fed alleviate the Great Depression.
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